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Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee again.
It seems disingenuous to describe law enforcement and public safety in Indian Country as an
urgent crisis because it has been a serious problem not just for years, but for decades. I
know that this Committee understands the importance of this issue and I applaud you for
taking up the issue today and providing an important forum for discussion and, hopefully,
for action.
Some facts related to Indian country are muddy, but this one is clear: the models of criminal
justice that are responsible for poor public safety in Indian country have emasculated tribal
governmental systems and made state and the federal officials the primary providers of
public safety in Indian country. State, county and federal governments have competing
priorities that distract them from the importance of public safety on Indian reservations.
Tribal governments are the only governments that are singularly concerned about the quality
of life on reservations. Until tribal governments are restored to a central role and made
primarily responsible for assuring safety on Indian reservations, we are likely to see
continued problems. Redressing the serious public safety problems on Indian reservations
will not be fully successful until the entire system is reconfigured to give tribal governments
primacy over reservation communities. Both tribal self-governance and public safety are
better served when tribes exercise a central role in providing public safety and
criminal justice on Indian reservations.
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Restoring the law enforcement powers of tribal government is a difficult political challenge.
Not only are state and the federal officials likely to object to transferring power to tribes, but
tribal leaders are unlikely to come to you to clamor for more authority. It may not be fruitful
politically for a tribal leader to say to Congress, “I would like to have greater power to lock
up my own people.” Moreover, since public safety is perhaps the most dire social problem
on American Indian reservations, tribal leaders may not have adequate resources to address
the issue successfully. In such circumstances, a tribal leader may think it irresponsible -- and
see no advantage politically -- in buying into almost certain failure. Moreover, it is politically
expedient for tribal leaders to have someone else to share the blame. States and the federal
government seem to be willing villains. Other than an occasional embarrassing report,
federal and state officials have little political accountability for the failure of public safety on
Indian reservations. Thus, though public safety can improve only through greater tribal
involvement, we should not expect to see tribal leaders clamoring for greater public safety
authority.
Though we must put tribal governments out front in addressing public safety, it will not be
an easy task. We cannot restore tribes greater authority without also helping them obtain the
necessary resources to do the job. Because I recognize significant political obstacles to wideranging restoration of tribal authority, I would like to focus now on partial solutions or
measures that might help improve tribal safety that are nevertheless short of wholesale
restoration of tribal authority on Indian reservations. One of the best resources tribal
governments can have is cooperation. It is to this resource I will now turn.
Partial Solutions/Improvements
If I leave you with one concrete idea here today, it should be the notion that cooperation
among existing law enforcement agencies across all orders of government is crucial in
dealing with violent crime in Indian country. Criminal offenders do not respect jurisdictional
boundaries. Thus, any reform proposal ought to attempt to foster cooperation among law
enforcement agencies.
To illustrate my point, I ask you to indulge me a brief anecdote. In 1998, when I was
serving as an Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting violent crimes in Indian country
in New Mexico, I had a chance encounter with Rudolph Giuliani who was then serving his
second term as Mayor of New York City. Giuliani had presided over a long and steady
period of decline in crime in New York, both as Mayor and, before that, as United States
Attorney, and he was basking in that success.
In light of the fact that violent crime in Indian country had been increasing steadily
throughout the 1990s at the same time that it had been decreasing throughout most of the
rest of the country, I asked Giuliani what strategies we might use in Indian country to
achieve the successes that New York had achieved in reducing violent crime.
Giuliani pondered the question for a moment. He noted that as Mayor of New York City,
he had full control over law enforcement through all five boroughs, covering several million
citizens. Combining computer technology and improved crime reporting, his Comp-Stat
system could monitor the development of crime on a nearly instantaneous basis and with
such focus that it could detect crime problems on a block-by-block basis. This information
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allowed New York City to deploy police officers swiftly and efficiently to neighborhoods
desperately in need of attention and to move those resources again on the very next shift.
He made the New York City Police Department a model of responsiveness and
coordination.
When I asked Giuliani to bring that experience to bear on Indian country, he correctly
realized that such coordination was nearly impossible across such vast expanses of land in
Indian country jurisdictions, where no one law enforcement agency has unilateral authority
and where police officers are spread very thin. Under such circumstances, such coordination
simply could not be achieved in the way that it could under the Comp-Stat system and with a
single chain of command. He basically said, “you have a terrific problem ahead of you, kid,”
and wished me luck.
Giuliani’s astute insight about the importance of coordination in public safety came to mind
again a couple of years later in the aftermath of the World Trade Center disaster. On 9/11,
when fire and rescue personnel could not communicate with one another in the crucial
minutes before the towers fell, many lives were lost. In one tragic event, it became clear that
the tremendous coordination that Mayor Giuliani had achieved in law enforcement had
utterly eluded him in another key area of public safety. It was an important lesson for him, I
am sure, and it is an important lesson for all of us.
Because law enforcement authority in Indian country is spread across wide expanses of land
and many orders of government (federal, state, tribal, county, and municipal), we will never
be able to achieve the level of coordination that Mayor Giuliani’s police department achieved
in New York City. Indeed, our federal system is designed to spread out such authority
among different orders of government. Given limited resources and crisis conditions,
however, we must strive to avoid the lack of coordination that plagued the World Trade
Center disaster. We must recognize that no single law enforcement agency can address crime
alone. Thus, we must work to facilitate cooperation among them.
***
One lesson is that law enforcement can be effective in achieving public safety only if there is
adequate cooperation between the key actors. I offer the following observations.
I.
Most of the law enforcement successes in Indian country have come from
careful and effective cooperation between law enforcement authorities.
Law enforcement works best when neither the offender, nor the law-abiding citizen, can
detect any gaps in coverage. When a potential offender scans the landscape and considers
whether to break the law, he must see a unified front among law enforcement officials. To
put it another way, the thin blue line that protects the ordinary citizen from the criminal
element cannot be effective if it is a dotted line.
Most citizens in the United States do not care strongly who responds to public safety crises,
they just want to know that when they dial 911, they will get the help that they need. It is the
job of government to ensure that kind of confidence. Especially in the many rural districts
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that include Indian country, effective law enforcement can be achieved only with close
cooperation between governments.
The good news is that cooperation between law enforcement agencies is occurring widely in
Indian country. This Committee has heard ample testimony of such cooperation,
particularly in the methamphetamine context, including tremendous successes at Wind River
in Wyoming and with my own tribe, the Chickasaw Nation, in Oklahoma. As tribal
organizations build capacity, they are working more and more with their state and federal
counterparts.
In most of the states that have federally-recognized Indian tribes, tribal governments have
entered agreements with states and/or counties that facilitate cooperation. Many states and
the federal government, of course, also provide mechanisms for state-wide recognition of
tribal police as law enforcement officers. In other states, these agreements are struck at the
local level. These agreements span a range of law enforcement activities, reflecting mutual
aid efforts, cross-deputization or cross-commission agreements, extradition, and other
cooperative action arrangements. They also sometimes address thorny issues such as liability
and sovereign immunity. And in addition to normal law enforcement activity, the
agreements also sometimes cover the sharing of information between agencies, such as prior
arrests, traffic records, and other criminal history.
Effective cooperative agreements have the ability to simplify complex questions, freeing law
enforcement officers to focus on the most important aspects of their jobs. The Committee
is well aware of the jurisdictional complexities of Indian country, and I will not belabor
them here, but police officers tend to be well-trained in the police sciences, not in ethnology
or land surveying. Cooperative agreements tend to allow police officers to focus on public
safety and not on highly artificial and arcane legal issues, such as jurisdictional boundary
lines.
Still, though cooperation is occurring widely, it is not universal by any means. In many
jurisdictions, cooperation is not formalized.
II.
Even informal or de facto cooperation between law enforcement agencies can
help produce law-abiding behavior and thus serve public safety.
Even in the absence of formal agreements, the appearance of cooperation and coordination
between police officers can help to create an effective public safety net. One of my
colleagues, a law professor who is a non-Indian, recently illustrated this point well. While
working on the Navajo Reservation, she was stopped for driving in excess of the speed limit
on a lonely reservation highway. When she mentioned that she was non-Indian and that the
tribe might not have jurisdiction, the tribal officer apparently offered to let her wait for a
state trooper and have her case adjudicated in the state system, with the attendant delay and
other ramifications that such action would entail. 1 Under such circumstances, the mere
threat of cooperation between law enforcement officials led the professor to see that
objecting to tribal authority would waste her time, would likely not be fruitful, and might
1

Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1047, 1048-49 & n. 7 (2005).
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subject her to more severe traffic penalties. She accepted the citation and opted for the
tribal process.
One could easily imagine the same scenario involving a state trooper and American Indian
violators. Thus, even informal cooperation, or the appearance of it, can help to assure
offenders and non-offenders alike that there is no prosecution-free zone in Indian country.
Whether it occurs formally or informally, cooperation often is the norm in Indian country.
Cops tend to be able to work with other cops, especially at the street level, primarily because
they share a common enemy and they realize that the enemy is not other law enforcement
agents.
III.
While cooperation and trust between law enforcement agencies can improve
public safety, conflict and lack of cooperation among such agencies can only
undermine public safety.
Street level police officers may have friendly rivalries with those from other agencies, but
they often work well together when responding to a crime or undertaking an investigation.
They know that crime control and public safety can be achieved far more successfully when
law enforcement agencies work together. Sometimes, however, agencies fail to cooperate.
When this happens, public safety suffers.
Some recent events in my own state of Minnesota illustrate the potential for trouble when
law enforcement agencies fail to work together. The Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians
exercises some law enforcement functions on its reservation. It also cooperates closely with
state and county officials who have law enforcement authority under a 1953 Congressional
statute called Public Law 280. In circumstances in which county and tribal law enforcement
share authority within the same geographic space, cooperation is key. Indeed, Mille Lacs
County and the Mille Lacs Band entered into an agreement in 1998 that provides that each
agency shall provide mutual assistance to the other. The 1998 agreement also addresses
other important issues, such as how prosecutions will be commenced and how liability for
law enforcement torts will be allocated and waives tribal immunity for such actions against
the tribe to be tried in the same manner as for municipalities within the state.
As a result of the agreement, tribal police officers have routinely referred criminal activities
to the County Attorney for state prosecution. Since the Band employs 19 tribal police
officers who are certified law officers under state law, the Band is a significant partner in
providing public safety on the reservation. The Band spends approximately $2 million a year
on law enforcement activities and provides a significant law enforcement presence in that
part of the County.
Recently, however, the relationship between the County and the Band has deteriorated. The
Mille Lacs County Attorney, who is responsible for prosecuting the offenses that arise in
Mille Lacs County, has challenged the very existence of the Mille Lacs Reservation itself,
arguing that it was disestablished in the early 1900s. In a memo to county employees last
year, she ordered all employees to stop referring to Indian land as “reservation” land. This
assertion, which conflicts with the County’s own agreement with the tribe, caused an
unnecessary rift between the County and the Band. Apparently emboldened by the County
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Attorney’s actions, some of the worst prejudices of some members of one of the local
communities were on display at a summer parade after news of the memo circulated. On
that day, citizens lining the parade route booed and made obscene gestures toward a float
carrying elderly American Indian war veterans.
To a criminal law professor, those boos sound an awful lot like the fabric of the community
tearing under the enormous weight of prejudice. While booing elderly Indian veterans may
be protected speech under the First Amendment, it suggests trouble ahead to anyone
concerned about public safety. Imagine the public safety concerns that arise when a crowd
of people feel emboldened to express animus in a way that violates our fundamental social
norms of respect for the elderly and honor for our nation’s war veterans. Will such people
commit acts of violence? If police are called out, will these prejudiced people respect statecertified tribal police officers who are engaged in the routine work of law enforcement in
keeping peace?
It is the job of law enforcement officers to build cooperation, not destroy it. Thus, the
failure of the county attorney to work toward trust and cooperation may have long term
ramifications. This past spring, another occurrence from the same locale stoked great
mistrust of the County Attorney by tribal members. In the course of attempting to bring a
prosecution for a minor offense, the County arrested a child victim of an assault, only 11
years old, who was jailed overnight, and required to appear in court the next day in an
orange jail jumpsuit. The incident drew howls of protest in the tribal community. The tribe
felt that the arrest of the child victim had the effect of victimizing the child a second time.
As a result, the County Attorney has largely lost the confidence of a large number of the
people that she is intended to serve. These events raise an important question: what
happens when cooperation fails and law enforcement loses the trust of the community it has
been given the responsibility to serve?
IV.
Cooperation must be encouraged at every step of the process. When it fails,
tribal communities must have alternative options.
Congress must work to provide incentives for cooperation among state, federal and tribal
law enforcement agencies.
As the previous discussion indicates, however, cooperation may fall short even when strong
incentives already exist. Through cooperation, the Mille Lacs County Attorney has 19
additional tribal police officers at her disposal to maintain public safety and respond to
crimes. This is a tremendous incentive to cooperate. Yet, the County Attorney seems to
have worked to undermine that cooperation and made it difficult for tribal law enforcement
officials to work with the County.
In circumstances where positive incentives toward cooperation fail, Congress should create
an alternative approach, an escape valve, if you will, for tribes. In Public Law 280 states, for
example, Congress should give tribes the full ability to opt out of state Public Law 280
jurisdiction in circumstances in which the tribes have lost confidence in the state officials
responsible for public safety. While tribes now have a limited retrocession option, existing
law requires states to consent to the exercise of such an option. Giving the state the right to
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veto a retrocession is ill-advised because it prevents the tribe from going elsewhere if the
state is not doing its job. The state ought to have incentive to serve the tribe well.
A tribal option for retrocession, that is, a choice, would further tribal self-government by
putting key law enforcement questions in the hands of the tribe and force the state to be
responsive to the tribe if it wishes to keep the tribe as a partner. It would also further public
safety because it would make the government accountable to the community it is supposed
to be serving. If a reservation community believes that the state is doing a good job, then
the state can continue. But if the state is doing a poor job, then it can install a federal/tribal
system in which tribal officials will be forced to exercise greater accountability for public
safety.
To address public safety, Congress should encourage the more robust exercise of existing
tribal criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses by American Indians. Tribal
governments are better situated and more responsive to reservation communities. They are
thus likely to do a better job in addressing public safety than any federal or state officials can.
For a limited category of offenses, Congress should consider, perhaps on a pilot basis, giving
those responsible tribes that are interested in participating a modicum of misdemeanor
criminal authority over non-Indians who commit crimes involving Indians on the
reservation. With appropriate safeguards, such jurisdiction could resolve many of the
continuing problems in Indian country by placing control over law enforcement and criminal
justice with the government that is best situated – and best motivated – to address violent
crimes and minor narcotics offenses. Accepting the exercise of limited criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians by tribal governments is a very modest step toward addressing a public
safety problem that has existed for far too long.
***
A final word. Modern federal policymakers have long been interested in furthering tribal
self-government because tribal governments are better at providing services to tribal
communities. If we wish to promote public safety, it is hard to imagine a better way to do
that than by empowering the government that is most interested in providing it. No
government has a greater interest in reservation safety than the government that calls the
reservation home. Only the tribal government is fully accountable to the reservation
community that must live without public safety.
Likewise, it is hard to imagine a subject more crucial to tribal self-government than public
safety. A community cannot effectively exercise self-government when it cannot establish an
environment in which citizens can safely and vigorously engage in the activities of
governance. Effective tribal law enforcement is a key ingredient to reservation public safety.
Scholars can quibble about whether tribal courts should be able to try non-Indians, or
whether state or federal courts are fair or effective, but unless we have adequate law
enforcement in place, all this quibbling is no more useful than re-arranging office chairs in
the World Trade Center on September 10, 2001. We do not need agreement on all
jurisdictional issues to create public safety in Indian country, but we do need cooperation
among those players whose task is to ensure public safety. Those agencies that do not
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cooperate ought to be strongly encouraged to do so. If they fail to improve, they should
step aside in favor of governments that are more interested in providing public safety.
Thank you for asking me to appear here today.
Disclaimer: The comments expressed herein are solely those of the author as an individual
member of the academic community; the author does not represent the University of
Minnesota for purposes of this testimony.
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